Abstract
Introduction
IEEE 802.16 is a new standard for Broadband wireless access (BWA) and it has opened new horizons for broadband communication. IEEE 802.16 is a standard based technology that exhibits potential to provide last mile wireless broadband access providing fixed [8] , nomadic, portable and now mobile wireless broadband connectivity in cost effective manner.
The entire security of 802.16 lies in the Privacy Sublayer [9] . The point of this Security Sublayer is to provide access control and confidentiality to the data link layer. Security Sublayer uses protocols and mechanisms including Security Associations (SA), X.509 certificates, Privacy Key Management Protocol (PKM) and encryption to provide the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) triad of security [12] .
Two Privacy and Key Management (PKM) protocol versions are being used in privacy sub-layer of 802.16e, PKM version 1 (PKMv1) and PKM version 2 (PKMv2). IEEE 802.16e uses two varied mechanisms named PKM Extensible Authentication Protocol (PKM-EAP) and PKM (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) PKM-RSA for authentication. The primary concern of this paper is to analyze the existing PKM authentication protocol. A hybrid methodology to improve PKM authentication protocol is provided along with implementation results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the working of PKM and its different versions with special focus on PKMv2. Vulnerabilities of PKM authentication protocol are analyzed along with potential attacks while Section 3 sheds light on proposed novel methodology to counter the attacks. Section 4 gives introduction of implementation scenario, provides the description of implementation methodology in OMNET++ simulator and presents the comparison between existing approach and new approach to mitigate mentioned threats. As a final point, section 5 presents the conclusions and future work drawn from the research.
Brief Introduction and Working of PKM Versions
The PKM facilitates authentication of SS (Subscriber Station) to BS (Base Station). It provides distribution services to traffic keying material from BS to SS as well as periodic reauthentication /reauthorization and key refresh [2] . PKMv1 uses X.509 based digital certificates to authenticate SS only and uses SHA1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) based derivation functions. The Authorization scheme of PKMv1 protocol is shown in Figure 1 . In PKMV2 mutual authentication is mandatory along with usage of AES (Advanced Encryption standard) based key derivation functions and other security enhancements.
Three-way handshake is employed to distribute keying material for all the SAs (Security Associations) active between SS and BS. It relies upon the shared AK (Authorization Key) between SS and BS, which may be implemented by either PKMv2 RSA or EAP or any combination of both. One attack is also identified on AK in [10] by Greiler.
Vulnerabilities of PKM Authentication Protocol
Sen XU et al. in [3] discussed vulnerabilities of PKM authentication protocols and attacks resulting from these vulnerabilities. One way authentication of PKMv1 leads to attack of rogue BS. Rogue base station attack is similar to man in the middle attack in which fake BS can take the messages from the valid SS and generate its own key to get into the communication with original SS. Another possible attack is replay attack in which an attacker saves the messages sent by legitimate SS and then replays them in later point of time effectively denying service to legitimate user.
Figure 1. Authorization scheme used in PKMv1 Protocol
New reinforced authentication Protocol of PKMv2 is also at risk to attacks including suppress replay attack and interleaving attack. Suppress replay attack is an outcome of resynchronization problem of distributed clocks [5] . Synchronization of clocks are also the part of network entry for any SS [11] .
Figure 2. Authorization Scheme used in PKMv2 Protocol
In this attack an adversary can intercept a postdated message from sender and replays it when the timestamp in the message becomes current at recipient sites. Another possible attack on PKMv2 authentication protocol is Interleaving attack identified by [4] . It involves an attacker replaying the signed message of a legitimate SS to BS and then uses the impersonated SS, usually by forcing another protocol instance run, to decrypt the replays sent by BS, thereby allowing attacker to effectively impersonate legitimate SS.
Mitigation Approaches
In this section the existing approaches to mitigate the vulnerabilities of PKM authentication are discussed with an emphasis on PKMv2. We will then present our approach (hybrid approach) in next section, towards solution of vulnerabilities. Both of these approaches are then implemented and checked in OMNET ++ environment. Firstly the time stamp aprroach presented in [3] is discussed and later we willl discuss our approach (hybrid) along with testing scenarios.
Existing Approach
For basic PKM authentication protocol, one way authentication and replay attack can be mitigated as described in [3] . The authors proposed timestamp as a replacement for nonce, like in PKMv2. Addition of BS's certificate in one message avoids the possibility of rogue BS attack. Authors changed message 2 and message 3 shown in Figure 1 to avoid mentioned attacks. The problem with this approach is that, it depends heavily on synchronized clocks and may become vulnerable to suppress replay attacks. If, however only nonce is used as mentioned in [6] it would only assure SS that message 3 in Figure 1 is replied to its corresponding request. The BS still faces the replay attack because it has no way to determine the freshness of message. Similarly the aforementioned vulnerabilities of PKMv2 still remain unaddressed.
Hybrid Approach
The solution implemented in this research paper is based on [1] to use both timestamp and nonce for enhanced security to prevent from identified threats. This approach may be named as hybrid approach. This method provides better security because when both nonce and timestamp are used in parallel, timestamp will guarantee the freshness of message and nonce will assure that the message in question is a reply of previous message and also ensure defense in depth in the case if attacker synchronizes its clock with the SS or BS. The attacker will not be able to get nonce providing another layer of security. The changed and proposed authorization protocol is shown in Figure 3. 
Implementation and Results
We use the OMNET++ to configure the WiMAX network while defining its packet formats. Base Stations and Mobile Stations or Subscriber Stations are configured with their specific properties to handle the messages coming from other nodes.
Scenarios of Implementation
The scenarios, in which simulation has been done, to verify the result, consists of 2 Attackers with 4 Mobile Stations and a single BS. We have two scenarios. First scenario considers the time stamp solution as given in [3] . Time stamp solution is attacked by the Suppress replay attack. First scenario will show the after effects of the network when network is suffering with the Suppress Replay attacks. Second scenario shows the aftereffect of attack when mitigation solution based on hybrid approach is in place. This scenario would provide the necessary effectiveness proof of hybrid approach. In the Figure 4 , it is shown that there are total 22 illegal requests sent to Base Station by Attackers and all are accepted by BS. There is no green bar in Base Station, which shows that Base Station is accepting all the request messages sent by the MSs as well as attackers. Sum of all request packets is 65 which is the same number as that of packets being accepted by Base Station shown in Figure 5 . This means Base Station is accepting all legitimate and illegitimate packets without authenticating them. Figure 6 shows the results after implementation of hybrid approach. This bar chart shows the dropped packets by the Base Station. Total 14 packets are sent from the attackers as shown by the red bars and dropped packets are shown by green bars. It is evident from the bar chart that Attackers are sending 14 illegitimate request packets and Base Station is dropping the 14 request packets that are just sent from the attackers.
Implementation Results of Existing Approach with Timestamp

Results after implementation of Hybrid Approach
For hybrid approach we again plotted the same vectors in Figure 7 as we plotted for the demonstration of previous solution methodology. Total illegal and legal request packets sent from the Attackers and MSs respectively are shown in Figure 7 as well as packets that are not accepted by the Base Station. It is obvious that using the hybrid approach no illegitimate packet is accepted by the Base Station and also it identifies the interleaving attack while preventing the network from the suppress replay attack which leads us to conclude the effectiveness of hybrid approach. 
Conclusion and Future Work
This research focused on the security of PKMv2. Different attacks were analyzed against diverse proposed security solutions. Hybrid approach is verified using simulator and having a comparison with old techniques and new attacks including suppress and interleaving attack. Implementation of proposed algorithm that is explained in [1] and tested the model against mentioned attacks.
Still, there are many threats on Mobile WiMAX that are possible including ones during secure handovers between heterogeneous networks identified in [7] , multicasting etc. Future work would include the practical solutions and their implementations in real time environment for security enhancements next to above revealed attacks.
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